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The 
Supreme Court 
and Private Schools: 
An Update 
NEAL DEVINS 
13 
FOR the first time, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that states may properly "conclude that there is a strong public interest in assuring 
the continued financial health of private schools, both sectarian and nonsec-
tarian." Consequently, many aid schemes benefiting private schools-and 
heretofore thought unconstitutional-may in the future be upheld as con-
stitutional. 
The Court espoused the virtues of private education in their July 1983 de-
cision, Mueller v. Allen. Mueller upheld, in a 5 to 4 vote, a tuition tax-de-
duction scheme which permitted parents of Minnesota schoolchildren to de-
duct expenses incurred in providing "tuition, textbooks, and transportation" 
for their children, whether they attend public or private schools. The statute 
was challenged by Minnesota taxpayers who alleged that the tax deduction 
provided unconstitutional state assistance to sectarian institutions. 
There are still some limitations, however, for the Court has also recognized 
that private schools which violate "public policy" cannot receive government 
largesse. The Court's words of caution were contained in the May 1983 Boh 
Jones University v. United States decision. which held 8 to 1 that the tax-
exemption provision of the Internal Revenue Code does not extend to insti-
tutions whose practices are in violation of "fundamental public policy." The 
university's religious-based practice of prohibiting interracial dating was 
deemed contrary to the national policy of nondiscrimination. The university 
was also unsuccessful in its contention that the Internal Revenue Service 
could not enforce its policy against schools that engage in racial discrimi-
nation based upon "sincerely held religious belief." 
. Taken together, Bob Jones University and Mueller represent a public-pol-
ley breakthrough for private education. Mainstream private education groups 
SUch as the National Association of Independent Schools and the Council of 
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American Private Education support, and their member schools general1 
conform to, state regulations ensuring a quality education in a socially aeeep{. 
able environment. This stance reflects these groups' concern that private 
schools be recognized as beneficial and beneficent so that government will 
provide fiscal assistance to private education. Such aid will in turn make pri-
vate education an option available to more parents. Consequently, mainstream 
private educators opposed Bob Jones University because that institution's 
practices conveyed the image that private schools were havens for parents 
of white school children fleeing from integration. Mainstream private-school 
groups also supported the Minnesota tax-deduction program, not only be-
cause the statute conveyed a positive image of private education but also 
because the Court's upholding of the statute removed another obstacle in the 
way of government assistance to private schools. 
New Aid for Old Schools 
The Mue/ler v. Allell decision paves the way for expansive (or minuscule) 
state aid programs that benefit private schools. In Mueller, the Court circum-
scribed several 1970s decisions that had severely restricted state efforts to 
assist private schools. At issue in Mueller was the constitutional provis ion 
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," 
which applies to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution. 
Three values underlie this Establishment Clause: neutrality, religious ac-
commodation, and separation. Neutrality reflects the belief that all religions 
should be treated in a similar manner; that government should not extend 
special benefits to impose special impediments on any religion. Religious 
accommodation recognizes the inevitability of certain contacts between gov-
ernment and religion, as well as the propriety of some of these contacts 
to encourage religious practice. Separation seeks to ensure "the integrity of 
both church and state by prohibiting government from favoring religion over 
irreligion or vice-versa. 
To determine whether a statute is constitutional, the Supreme Court has 
developed a three-part test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion; ... finally, the statute must not foster an ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion." If any of these three ele-
ments is not satisfied, the statute will be found unconstitutional. 
Supreme Court decisions intcrpreting this tripartite standard have been 
mystifying. Since 1971, among the programs the Court has found unconsti-
tutional are salary supplements for private-school teachers, service contracts 
calling for the state to pay nonpublic schools for providing secular education, 
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cash grants to schools for the costs of state-prepared and teacher-prepared 
testing, tuition reimbursement and tax credits for low-income parents, grants 
to schools for maintenance and repair, loans of instructional equipment and 
materials to both private schools and private school pupils, and grants for 
field trip transportation. Yet the Court has also upheld a variety of aid 
schemes, including school bus transportation, textbook loans, real property 
tax exemptions, (federal) construction grants for church-related colleges, 
speech and hearing diagnostic services, medical services, neutral-site thera-
peu tic services, programs for the handicapped, neutral-site guidance and 
counseling, and direct grants to schools for the cost of state-mandated and 
state-prepared tests. 
Apparently the Court has recognized a certain inconsistency among these 
decisions, noting "that the wall of separation that must be maintained between 
church and state 'is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on 
all the circumstances of particular relationship.' " In a similar vein, the Court 
furt her noted that they can only "dimly perceive" the boundary between con-
stitutional and unconstitutional aid. Therefore, although the tripartite test "is 
well settled," in particular cases it resembles less a set formula than a "help-
ful signpost." 
One clement of the tripartite test, however, is clear. If the government 
program at issue is arguably nonreligious, the program will satisfy the sec-
ular purpose element of the tripartite test. In Committee for Public Edllca-
tion v. Nyquist (1973), the Supreme Court noted: 
[W]e do not doubt-indeed, we fully recognize-the validity of the State's in-
terest in promoting pluralism and diversity among its public and nonpublic 
schools. Nor do we hesitate to acknowledge the reality of its concern for an 
already overburdened public school system that might suffer in the event that 
a significant percentage of the children presently attending nonpublic schools 
should abandon those schools in favor of the public schools. 
In Mueller v. A lien, the Court elaborated on the reasons for this. Past gov-
ernment aid to private schools was accepted because the motivations of the 
respective states were not unconstitutional. "A state's decision to defray the 
Cost of educational expenses incurred by parents," wrote the Court, "is both 
secular and understandable." 
Significantly more complicated than the question of secular purpose, how-
e~er, are those involving the secular effect and entanglement prongs of the 
~Ipartite test. Mueller sheds little direct light on entanglement. According to 
arvard law professor Laurence Tribe, entanglement occurs when govern-
ment attempts to "insinuate itself coercively into rcligious life, by policing 
the expenditure of public monies to assure, as the establishment clause itself 
re . 
qUIres, that such monies arc expended only for secular purposes." In M uel-
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ler, the "only plausible source" of entanglement was the state requirement 
that their officials determine whether particular textbooks qualify for a de. 
duction. Because the Supreme Court upheld similar procedures in its 1968 
Board of Education v. Allen decision, the Mueller Court reasoned that the 
"same result follows in this case." 
The primary determination the Supreme Court made in Mueller Was 
whether the Minnesota tax-deduction provision violated the secular effeet 
provision of the Establishment Clause test by giving parents of private school 
children disproportionate benefits. The deduction was limited to actual ex. 
penses for "tuition, textbooks, and transportation" of all grade-school or high. 
school children; a deduction could not exceed $500 per dependent in grades 
K-6, and $700 per dependent in grades 7-12. Those challenging the statute 
pointed to the fact "that for the school year 1978-1979 ... only 79 students 
paid tuition for attendance at Minnesota public schools .... By contrast, the 
number of school children attending nonpublic schools in Minnesota during 
the 1979-1980 school year, was 90,954. Of these, 86,808 (95.44 percent) 
attended schools considering themselves to be sectarian." Against this posi. 
tion the state argued that the "expenses are quite varied and are, in fact, avail· 
able to every taxpayer in the state of Minnesota whether that taxpayer's child 
attends public or private school." The state of Minnesota went on to cite ten· 
nis shoes, bus transportation, driver training tuition, summer school tu ition 
and the like as examples of deductions open to all. 
Who Benefits from Private Education? 
Court decisions predating Mueller demonstrated the Justices' willingness 
to look beyond the mere language of a statute to determine the actual ben· 
eficiaries of a state assistance program. The "primary effect [of an enactment] 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion." In two 1973 Su-
preme Court decisions which invalidated state efforts to make the private ed-
ucation option more affordable, the Court ruled that only those laws which 
had "a remote and incidental effect advantageous to religious institutions" 
could pass constitutional muster. 
In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, the Court invalidated a 
New York law allowing tax deductions for nonpublic-school tuition payments 
gauged to the tax bracket of each taxpayer. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Lewis Powell reasoned that "[b]y reimbursing parents for a portion of their 
tuition bill, the state seeks to relieve their financial burdens sufficiently to as-
sume that they continue to have the option to send their children to religious-
oriented schools." It did not matter whether or not sectarian institutions ac-
tually received money from this; what mattered was that they benefited from 
them. In the Sloan v. Lemon decision, issued the same day as Nyquist, the 
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c ourt rendered unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute that partially reim-
bursed parents for nonpublic elementary and secondary school tuition. Fol-
lowing the Nyquist rationale, the Court noted that "we look to the substance 
of the program, and no matter how it is characterized its effect remains the 
same. The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic 
benefit. " 
Nyquist and Sloan were considered especially significant since the Court 
indicated that the state could not even indirectly assist predominantly sec-
tarian private education through parental aid programs. In the 1971 Lemon 
v. Kurtzman decision the Court concluded that the state could not directly 
assist private schools if such aid granted the state "any direction, supervision 
or control over the policy determination, personnel, curriculum, program of 
instruction or any other aspect of the administration or operation of any non-
public school." It thus appeared that only such nonideological aid as bus 
transportation and textbooks could pass constitutional muster. 
The rigid analysis utilized in Nyquist and Sloan was criticized for its short-
sigh tedness. Chief Justice Warren Burger's dissent noted that the New York 
and Pennsylvania programs "merely attempt to ... [give] to parents of pri-
vate school children, in the form of dollars or tax deductions, what the par-
ents of public school children receive in kind. It is no more than simply equity 
to grant partial relief to parents who support the public schools they do 
not use." The Chief Justice argued that the New York and Pennsylvania pro-
grams actually fostered government neutrality towards religion by providing 
all students a right to attend the school of their choice. A similar criticism 
was levied at the Court by a Note in the Harvard Law Review: 
[T]he overall effect of the government's school financing program ... with its 
disincentives as well as incentives to private education . . . was not evaluated . 
. . . By defining neutrality narrowly ... the Court perceived no conflict between 
[two of the values which underlie the Establishment Clause, namely] neutrality 
and separation. This narrow approach to neutrality made the Court's decision 
appear consistent with both policies; the real conflict between separation and 
neutrality was never squarely faced. 
This is a crucial point. When the Court seeks to determine the "actual ben-
eficiaries" of a state enactment, it looks narrowly to the effect of the enact-
ment on private religious schools. Never do they address the issue of how such 
laws affect public and nonpublic education as a whole. In other words, an 
enactment whose marginal effect makes predominantly church-affiliated pri-
Vate education more affordable will be found unconstitutional under the Ny-
qUist-Sloan view-regardless of whether the state could have constitutionally 
created a school finance system similar to the one resulting from the new laws. 
The Nyquist-Sloan standard was loosened somewhat in 1977 with Wolman 
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v. Walter. In Wolman, the Court upheld those portions of an Ohio statute 
authorizing expenditures of state funds for supplying nonpublic school stu-
dents with textbooks, standardized testing and scoring services, on-site speech 
and hearing diagnostic services, and neutral-site therapeutic and remedial ser-
vices. At the same time, the Court invalidated those parts of the statute which 
provided nonpublic schools with instructional materials and field trip ser-
vices. To justify these seemingly inconsistent rulings, the Court concluded such 
educational aid is acceptable if it is most likely that it "will only have sec-
ular value of legitimate interest to the State and doesn't present any appre-
ciable risk of being used to aid transmission of religious views." The Wolman 
ruling, like Nyquist and Sloan, thus involved a judicial determination as to 
the "actual effects" of a state aid program. 
In Mueller v. Allen, the Supreme Court took an analytical leap of fai th 
and refused to consider the actual effect of the Minnesota program. Justice 
William Rehnquist, writing for the Court, contended: "We would be loath 
to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on 
annual reports reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens 
claimed benefits under the law." They justified this refusal to look at the ac-
tual beneficiaries of the Minnesota program by noting private- and public-
school parents could both take advantage of the tax-deduction program.1 
Those statutes where the Court did look at actual effects involved state aid 
programs available only to private schools and parents of private school chi l-
dren. The Mueller Court, however, did not adopt Chief Justice Burger's view 
that the Court had been too short-sighted in looking only at the marginal ef-
fects of state-aid packages directed at private education. Instead, the Court 
concluded that, since parents of both public and private school children could 
participate in the program, the marginal effect of the Minnesota program was 
presumptively secular. The possible significance of both public and private 
school children participating in a state-aid program was noted by the Court 
in its Nyquist opinion: "Allen [textbooks] and Everson [public transportation] 
differ from the present litigation .... In [those] cases the class of beneficiaries 
1 The Court also noted that the educational tax deduction was only one among many 
tax deductions and other tax benefits granted by Minnesota. Minnesota law also allowed 
deductions for medical expenses and contributions to religious institutions. Stressing 
that the broad class of beneficiaries able to participate in the Minnesota program cre-
ated a presumption of permissible "benevolent neutrality" towards religious institutions, 
the Court noted "that traditionally 'legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating 
classifications and distinctions in tax statutes,' in part because the 'familiarity with local 
conditions' enjoyed by legislators especially enables them to 'achieve an equitable dis-
tribution of the tax burden.''' Criticizing this conclusion, Justice Marshall noted in dis-
sent that" [i] t was precisely the substantive impact of the financial support, and not its 
particular form, that rendered the programs in Nyquist and Sloan v. Lemon uncon-
stitutional. " 
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included all school children, those in public as well as those in private schools." 
Yet, as Justice Thurgood Marshall's dissenting opinion pointed out, that "the 
Minnesota statute makes some small benefit available to all parents cannot 
alter the fact that the most substantial benefit provided by the statute is avail-
able only to those parents who send their children to schools that charge tui-
tion." As the largest allowable deduction was for tuition, this break was only 
for parents of private school children. 
A New Look at Private Schools 
The apparent doctrinal shift set out in Mueller is best attributed to the 
Court's adoption of two new views of the state's relationship to private edu-
cation. First, the Court rejected its earlier adopted position that "political 
divisions on religious lines is one of the principal evils that the first amend-
ment sought to forestall." Today, however, the danger of such evils is re-
mote, "and when viewed against the positive contributions of sectarian 
schools" seems an "entirely tolerable" risk. 
Second, the Court in Mueller stressed the positive role private schools play 
in our educational system: 
Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have provided an 
educational alternative for millions of young Americans; they often afford whole-
some competition with our public schools; and in some States thcy relieve sub-
stantially the tax burden incident to the operation of public schools. The State 
has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest qual-
ity for all children within its boundaries, whatever school their parents choose 
for them. 
The Court boldly held that whatever inequality there was in the utilization 
of such deductions was no more than a "rough return for the benefits ... 
provided to the state and all taxpayers by parents sending their children to 
parochial school." 
This attitude is quite a shift from the 1975 Supreme Court decision Meek 
v. Pittenger, which found unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute providing 
"auxiliary services" (maps, charts, laboratory equipment) to nonpublic school 
~hildren: "Even though earmarked for secular purposes, 'When it flows to an 
mstitution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its 
f~nctions are subsumed in the religious mission,' state aid has the impermis-
Sible primary effect of advancing religion." This conclusion was predicated 
on the Court's view that the real purpose of much sectarian education was 
"the inculcation of religious values and belief." Indeed, a remarkable passage 
~ontained in Justice William Douglas's concurring opinion in Lemon v. 
urtzman reflects this same view: 
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In the parochial schools Roman Catholic indoctrination is included in eVe 
subject. History, literature, geography, civics, and science are given a Rom; 
Catholic slant. The whole education of the child is filled with propaganda. Tha~ 
of course, is the very purpose of such schools, the very reason for going to ali 
of the work and expense of maintaining a dual school system. Their purpose is 
not so much to educate, but to indoctrinate and train, not to teach scripture 
truths and Americanism, but to make loyal Roman Catholics. The children are 
regimented, and are told what to wear, what to do, and what to think. 
Those challenging the Minnesota scheme advanced this argument: "A strong 
public education system is essential to the continued success of our democratic 
society .... Continuing efforts to divert revenues from public elementary and 
secondary schools is cause for alarm .... [D]iverting revenue from public 
education to support nonpublic, primarily religious school is not only detri-
mental to our public education system, it violates the concept of separation 
of church and state." Although a bare five-member majority of the Mueller 
Court found this argument unpersuasive, four of the Justices still abide by 
the Nyquist-Sloan formula, noting in their dissent that direct or indirect "aid 
to the educational function of [parochial schools] ... necessarily results in 
aid to the sectarian enterprise as a whole." 2 
In many ways the Mueller decision posited a new theory of church-state 
relations. Instead of viewing their relationship as necessarily divisive, the 
Court contended that "[a]t this point in the 20th century we are quite far 
removed from the dangers that prompted the framers to include the Estab-
lishment Clause in the Bill of Rights." In fact, the Court went so far as to 
recognize that "the Minnesota legislature'S judgment that a deduction for ed-
ucational expenses fairly equalizes the tax burden of its citizens and encour-
ages desirable expenditures for educational purposes is entitled to substantial 
2 Mueller, by rejecting the view that any aid scheme to private schools is tainted by the 
pervasively sectarian nature of such schools, may prove important in two significant 
issues not addressed by the Court. First, state efforts to provide private schools with 
services or materials have frequently been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 
under the secular effect standard. These rulings concluded that religious indoctrination 
was so central to these schools that the state could not aid the secular educational com-
ponent of church-related schools without also aiding these schools' predominant religious 
mission. Second, if the state sought to ensure that services or materials provided to pri-
vate schools did not improperly advance religion, the aid program would generally be 
found unconstitutional under the excessive entanglement standard. These holdings con-
cluded that the state could only ensure that its program had a secular effect through 
impermissible "comprehensive, discriminating and continued surveillance." The Mueller 
Court's recognition of the positive secular role that private schools play in our educa-
tional system thus rebuts much of the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine of taint that 
underlaid the invalidation of state efforts to provide materials or services to private 
schools. 
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deference." This represents a significant retreat from previous Establishment 
Clause decisions, in that the Court upheld the Minnesota provision despite 
the recognition that it was hard to distinguish between the economic effects 
of th is statute and others that had in the past been rendered unconstitutional. 
One explanation for this apparently drastic shift in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is the change in the Court's composition since the Nyquist-Sloan 
"no aid" era. Justices William O. Douglas and Potter Stewart-both part of 
the majority in the "no aid" era-have been replaced by John Paul Stevens 
and Sandra Day O'Connor. Justice Stevens has sided with the old view and 
Justice O'Connor with the new. In addition, Justice Lewis Powell, author of 
the Nyquist opinion, has modified his position and now supports the new 
view. Potentially more significant than even these shifts is the great possibility 
that a reelected President Reagan will appoint more Justices sympathetic to 
the new view. Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan-both 
staunch "no aid" advocates-are considered by many Court analysts as be-
ing near retirement. 
The immediate significance of Mueller v. Allen should not be overstated. 
Though it represents a new approach to Establishment Clause analysis, the 
Court was careful not to overrule any of its earlier decisions. Therefore most 
programs that provide direct government assistance to private schools or in-
di rect assistance solely to parents of private school children might still be 
unconstitutional. What Mueller does do is increase the likelihood that gov-
ernment can enact statutory provisions to provide a disproportionate benefit 
to parents of private school children-so long as parents of public school 
children can receive the same benefit through that provision. Outside the en-
actment of tax-deduction programs like the Minnesota plan, just what im-
pact Mueller will have on state aid programs to private schools is hard to 
gauge. On the one hand, aid schemes such as President Reagan's tuition tax-
credit proposal are probably unconstitutional since they benefit only parents 
of private school children. On the other hand, broad-based aid schemes like 
vouchers that attempt to reshape the whole of American education might 
very well be constitutional, since their benefits extend to all school children. 
Mueller, however, does indicate that the Justices might be more receptive 
to government aid programs which benefit private schools. This is supported 
by the Court's recent decision in Lynch v. Donnelly, a case which upheld the 
RhOde Island city of Pawtucket's inclusion of a Nativity Scene in its annual 
Christmas display. As in Mueller, the Donnelly decision refused to utilize strict 
Scrutiny standards in assessing the "religious effect" of the creche. Instead, the 
COurt noted that the "[Constitution] affirmatively mandates accommodation, 
not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any." This 
apparent trend of loosening Establishment Clause standards will soon be put 
to another test in the private school context. The Supreme Court has recently 
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agreed to hear the Grand Rapids v. Ball law suit. This case raises the signifi_ 
cant issue of "[w]hether it constitutes a per se violation of the establishment 
clause to provide secular, supplementary, nonsubstitutionary instructional 
services to part-time public school students on premises leased from religious_ 
ly-oriented nonpublic schools under conditions of public school control." 
Despite the possibility that the Court's decision in the Grand Rapids case 
might be favorable to private schools, Mueller might still serve as the impetus 
for federal and state aid to private education. The National Catholic Educa_ 
tion Association, for example, has proposed that the Reagan tuition tax-credit 
bill be modified to permit parents of public-school children to benefit from 
the legislation. Additionally, legislators in Wisconsin and New Jersey have 
recently introduced tax-deduction legislation similar to the Minnesota plan. 
Yet in those states with high private school enrollments, little effort has been 
made to mimic Minnesota. A recent study undertaken by the Washington 
Post blamed the economy for this legislative inertia: 
State taxes are going up while services are being trimmed, particularly in many 
of the northeastern and midwestern industrial states-normally the most fe rtile 
grounds for tuition tax benefits. The recession is particularly pressing urban 
areas ... where blue-collar ethnic groups with a Roman Catholic heritage are 
an important part of the political fabric and parochial school enrollments arc 
high. 
Another reason there hasn't been a strong legislative push in the states is that 
most private-school lobbyists had been concentrating on the recently tabled 
Reagan tuition tax-credit proposal. Once these groups begin to push for state 
tax-deduction legislation, they can expect a fierce fight from both mainstream 
public school groups (National Education Association, American Federation 
of Teachers, and National School Board Association) and constitutional lob-
byists (American Jewish Committee, American Civil Liberties Union. the 
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, and Americans United for Sepa-
ration of Church and State). It might ultimately prove to be the case in 
Mueller that while private school backers won the constitutional battle they 
lost the war. 
Private Discrimination and the Commonweal 
The Bob Jones University decision reaffirms the Supreme Court's view that 
racially discriminatory private schools are a detriment to American educa-
tion. In 1973, the Court invalidated a Mississippi statute where textbooks 
owned by the state were lent to both public- and private-school students 
"without reference to whether any participating private schools has racially 
discriminatory policies." In 1976, the Court held that section 1981 of the 
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Civil Rights Act (the right to contract) meant nonsectarian private schools 
could not deny admission to minority students. 
Bob Jones University clearly establishes that the government may not pro-
vide any benefit-aside from police or fire protection-to racially discrimina-
tory schools. The decision, written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, is replete 
with language arguing that racially discriminatory private schools cannot 
serve a public function: "[Thel legitimate education function [of such pri-
vate schoolsl cannot be isolated from discriminatory practices .... [Olis-
criminatory treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educational 
process." The Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradi-
cat ing racial discrimination in education. "Therefore. educational institutions 
guilty of racial discrimination cannot be considered 'beneficial and stabilizing 
influ ences in community life.' " 
So determined was the Court to establish the principle that racially dis-
criminatory private schools arc not entitled to tax breaks that it gave short 
shrift to the case's religious liberty issue. In Hoh Jones Vnil'ersity. the major-
ity concluded that the governmental interest at stake "substantially outweighs 
whatever burden den ial of tax benefit places on l the uni versi t y's 1 exercise of 
[itsl religious beliefs," that interest being "denying public support to racial 
discrimination in education." Yet, in determining that the Internal Revenue 
Code requires tax-exempt institutions to conform with fundamcntal public 
policy. the Court dcclined the opportunity to define a tax-exemption as gov-
ernment aid. What the Court did wa'i elevate the governmental interest so it 
could summarily dispo'ic of the case's rcligiou'i liberty issue. 
The Boh Jones Vnil'crsity decision extends beyond privak schools with ex-
plicit policies of racial di<,crilllination. ]n llnll"llally sweeping language. the 
Court defined the limit {)f public benefits: "Charitable exemptions arc jus-
tified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit--a benefit 
which the society or the community may not itself choose or be able to pro-
vide, or which SUPPlemcnts and advanccs the work of public institutions al-
ready supported by tax rcvenues .... The institution's purpose must not be 
so at odds with the cammon community conscience as to undcrminc any pub-
lic benefit that might otherwisc be conferred." In other words. Boh Jones 
Unirersity grants the IRS ncar-plenary authority to dcny tax-exempt statm 
to those private schools whose practices the I RS deems "at odds with the 
common community conscience." Responding to this, Justice Lewis Powell 
argued in his concurring opinion that the majority "ignores the important role 
played by tax-exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply con-
flict ing, activities and viewpoints." 
The principles of Bob Jones Unil'ersity also extend beyond the mere ques-
tion of tax-exempt status. The decision can be interpreted to mean that any-
one who receives government aid must conform to national public policy 
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(apparently defined both by legislation and the "common community Con_ 
science"). The potential danger here was pointed out in papers filed before 
the Court in Bob Jones University: 
And what about the ... organizations themselves? Would they become subject 
to myriad regulations and legal obligations .. . ? If so, retirement homes oper_ 
ated by particular religious charities might be forced to admit persons of any 
creed; private schools or organizations for girls or boys might be forbidden to 
discriminate on the basis of age; community centers designed to serve particular 
ethnic groups might have to open their doors to all comers; and any exempt 
organization might be required to modify its physical facilities to provide access 
to the handicapped. 
Regarding tax-exempt private schools, the question remains what to do with 
a school that is racially imbalanced due to factors unrelated to racial prac-
tices or beliefs. For instance, how should a private school whose classes are 
taught in German, Chinese, Hebrew, or Swahili be treated? Additional fac-
tors, such as location, idiosyncratic curricula and procedures, and admiss ions 
criteria based on religion, national origin, or measures of achievement may 
also lead to racially imbalanced schools. 
Nevertheless, despite the potential for extreme interpretation, mainstream 
private-education groups supported the approach taken in the Bob Jones Uni-
versity decision. These private-school groups were concerned with the bad 
publicity the tax-exemption issue was having on government efforts to aid 
private education. The 1978 Moynihan-Packwood tuition tax-credit proposal 
was partially stymied, for example, because of the Carter IRS's conclusion that 
existing racial nondiscrimination standards for tax-exempt private schools-
the standard proposed by tuition tax -credit backers to ensure that participat-
ing schools did not discriminate- were inadequate. Similarly, the 1982 Rea-
gan tuition tax-credit proposal was delayed in the Senate Finance Committee 
until the Supreme Court ruled on Bob Jones University. That way, if the 
Court decided that the nondiscrimination requirement was legally mandated, 
existing IRS procedures could be lIsed to police schools that participate in 
the proposed tuition tax-credit program. :l Consequently, the National Asso-
3 On November 16, 1983, Kansas Senator Robert Dole presented an amendment to the 
Senate whieh specified a nondiscrimination requirement for President Reagan's proposed 
tuition tax-credit legislation. Although inordinately complex (the Dole amendment takes 
up close to three pages in the Congressional Record), this proposal is less comprehe n-
sive than existing procedures governing the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory 
private schools. Under the Dole proposal, discri mination involves a specific act against 
a specific individual. IRS procedures, on the other hand, also demand that a tax-exe mpt 
institution formally adopt and a policy of racial nondiscrimination and advertise sllch 
policy in a local newspaper of general circulation. IRS procedures also do not fo re-
close the possibility of civil rights groups challenging the tax-exempt status of allegedly 
discriminatory institutions. Contrary to this, the Dole proposal mandates that a school 
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ciation of Independent Schools, hoping to establish better relationships be-
tween government and private education, made the following points before 
the Court in Bob Jones University: 
Private schools do believe that they are fully entitled to determine their own 
ph ilosophy, to design the curriculum and choose the teaching materials and 
methods they consider the most effective, and to admit students who they be-
lieve, and whose parents believe, will benefit from the education offered. But 
they do not believe that race as a criterion for admission is one that is in ac-
cord with the public interest or the public policy. 
The position taken by a minority of private schools ... that there is a right 
to discriminate on grounds of race, has been a thorn in the side of the private 
school world as a whole for some time and we are hopeful that the Court will 
settle the issue for once and for all. 
In Bob JOlles Ulli!'ersity the Court granted these private school interests their 
wish . 
Who Qualifies for Help? 
The Supreme Court's decisions in Boh Jones University and Mlleller did 
not address the state regulation of private schools. This issue is of great and 
immediate concern, as Christian fundamentalists are currently pressing to 
have state laws and regulations governing their schools declared unconstitu-
tional on religious liberty grounds. 
The fundamentalists believe that the state is for the most part prohibited 
from interfering with their schools. For them, the state's only legitimate in-
terest lies in ensuring that every school provides its students with an adequate 
education (reading, writing, computation) and satisfies reasonable fire, health, 
and safety standards. The fundamentalists refuse to abide by other state reg-
ulations. Generally speaking, however, the states are unwilling to give up their 
authority over the operation of nonpublic schools, believing that existing reg-
Ulations make educational sense. The states argue further that they are not 
noticeably interfering with religious practices. 
_ The Supreme Court has not yet resolved this issue. While its decisions sug-
be denied participation in the tuition tax-credit program only if it is found racially dis-
criminatory in a court action brought by the U.S. Attorney General. 
Also on November 16, the Senate voted (59-38) to table the tuition tax-credit pro-
~osal. Not overriding in this decision, however, was the issue of tax credits providing 
Indirect support to racial discriminatory private schools. Opponents of the tax-credit 
~r?posal also made allegations concerning: (1) the costliness of tax credits; (2) tax cred-
Its adVerse effect on public education; (3) the disproportionate benefit that tax credits 
prOvide tC'l families who do not need economic assistance; and (4) that tax credits violate 
t~e principle of separation of Church and State, since most private schools arc affiliated 
WIth some church. 
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gest that parents have a right to direct the upbringing of their children, it 
also recognizes that the state may impose reasonable regulations governing 
the operation of private schools. The line between reasonable and unreason_ 
able regulation and the significance of religious liberty concerns in making 
that determination are questions still in need of Supreme Court resolution. 
The decisions of those courts which have faced this issue are incredibly in-
consistent. It therefore appears likely that the next significant Supreme Court 
decision concerning the relationship between government and private educa_ 
tion will be on this issue. 
Bah Jones University and Mueller did address the issue of how government 
may aid private schools. Moreover, these decisions recognized the vital role 
private schools play in the education of American youth. Mueller, more than 
any other Court decision, legitimates the private education alternative through 
its recognition of private education not only as a worthwhile provider of edu-
cation but also as a boost to public education (though competition and the 
reduction of taxes needed to support the public school system). In short, 
Mueller says that private schools arc beneficial and the state has good reason 
to support them. Bob Jones University complements Mueller by establish ing 
parameters with in which the government may aid private schools; it forb ids 
government from benefiting individual private schools guilty of racial discrim-
ination. The decision aho permits the IRS and other executive agencies to 
develop regulatory schemes that deny government benefits to private schools 
whose policies are inconsistent with the principle of racial nondiscrimination 
and othcr fundamental public policies. The general proposition advanced in 
Mueller-that private schools are generally beneficent-is not contested in 
Bah Jones University. Put simply: the Court approves of facially neutral gov-
ernment efforts to aid private schools whose practices are in conformity with 
community standards. 
Conlnl0nplace Book 
The concept of a "wall" of separation hetween church and state is a liseful 
metaphor bIlt is not an accllrate description of the practical aspects of the 
relationship that in fact ('xists. The Constitution does not require complete 
separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, 
not merely tolerance, of all reliRiollS. and forhids hostility toward any. Any-
thing less would require the "callous indifference" ... that was never in-
tended by the Establishment Clause. 
United States Supreme Court 
LYllch, Mayor of Pawtllcket, v. Donnell." (Syllabus) 
March 5, 1984 
